BYU Law Review
Volume 2004 | Issue 4

Article 5

11-1-2004

Defending a Rule of Institutional Autonomy on
"No-Harm" Grounds
Mark Tushnet

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Organizations Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Mark Tushnet, Defending a Rule of Institutional Autonomy on "No-Harm" Grounds, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 1375 (2004).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2004/iss4/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

5TUS-FIN

11/11/2004 8:01 PM

Defending a Rule of Institutional Autonomy on
“No-Harm” Grounds
Mark Tushnet.∗
My comments begin by focusing on Professor Hamilton’s
defense of the “no-harm” principle—that is, the principle that
legislatures have the general authority to make their rules applicable
when those rules aim to reduce the incidence of harms defined with
reference only to secular standards.1 Professor Hamilton argues that
the no-harm principle conflicts with legal rules that give religious
institutions some sort of autonomy in their actions.2 And indeed it
does in one sense: One can define the no-harm principle to rule out
claims of institutional autonomy.
Understood in another way, however, the no-harm principle
leaves room for institutional autonomy or for exemptions of religious
institutions from the application of rules aimed at reducing the
incidence of harm. The argument I sketch here for institutional
autonomy is basically empirical and agrees with Professor Hamilton
in making harm-reduction the overriding social goal. The argument
proceeds in two steps. First, I suggest that autonomous institutions
may be able to socialize their adherents more effectively than
institutions that lack autonomy and that—if the institutions’ values
are compatible with the legislature’s—their more effective
socialization can produce a net reduction in the harms inflicted by
the institutions’ members. Second, autonomy for all institutions can
be defended if the gains from assuring autonomy for groups whose

∗ Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
Center.
1. In doing so, I will say nothing about history, in terms of either original
understandings or the evolution of constitutional doctrine, and very little about particular
doctrinal formulations. Instead, I will treat the choice as binary, between the no-harm principle
understood as a version of rationality review and the compelling-interest or necessity standard.
Professor Scharffs’s contribution suggests the important point that there may be no general
approach to these problems at all, but rather only a number of topic-specific rules. See Brett G.
Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1217.
2. Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099.
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values are compatible with the legislature’s values exceed the losses
from doing so for groups with values the legislature rejects.
After developing the general structure of the argument for
institutional autonomy, I raise several questions about it. Denying
institutions autonomy may weaken but not destroy their ability to
socialize effectively, and perhaps careful attention to questions of
design and their effects might allow us to come up with rules that
give institutions autonomy in some restricted domains while
subjecting them to regulation elsewhere. Additionally, the argument
I develop is cast in terms of institutions generally, and I explore
briefly the proposition that there is nothing distinctive about
religious institutions that should lead us to give them, but not other
institutions of civil society, autonomy. And, in conclusion, I wonder
whether the essentially empirical argument I develop is one that
courts can appropriately invoke, evaluate, and apply.
Consider the following possibility. Some general rule aims at
reducing the occurrence of discrimination on the basis of sex. A
particular religious institution is committed by the tenets of its faith
to nondiscrimination on the basis of sex.3 Of course, real people
inevitably fall short of full compliance with the tenets of their
religion. So there will be some incidents of discrimination on the
basis of sex as the institution goes about its daily operations.
Professor Hamilton’s “no-harm” principle allows the
government to invoke its antidiscrimination laws against those
incidents of discrimination.4 But perhaps external supervision of the
institution’s operation—supervision of the sort exemplified by
holding the institution liable for sex discrimination—undermines the
effectiveness of the religion to inculcate the nondiscrimination norm
as a matter of religious belief. That is, absent external supervision,
the religion teaches its adherents that discrimination is wrong, the
adherents believe the message, and they act on the belief with a high
degree of compliance. Allow external supervision, however, and the
adherents will not hear the message as effectively, or will not believe
it as strongly, or will not bring their actions into compliance with the
3. I am a bit uncomfortable with the standard formulation used here, which refers to
“religious institutions” as if the institutions themselves were somehow religious, rather than as
if they were—as they are—institutions whose members and participants self-consciously
identify the work they do in the institution with a particular religious tradition. I use the
standard formulation because it makes exposition easier.
4. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 1159.
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(religious) nondiscrimination norm. In these circumstances, the net
effect of recognizing institutional autonomy—relative to the world
governed strictly by the no-harm principle—is a reduction in secular
harm. Here, institutional autonomy serves the no-harm principle,
rather than being in conflict with it.5
I turn to filling in the sketch a bit, in a relatively informal way, to
capture the intuitions that lie behind the argument. I will highlight
two primary motivations that justify a rule of institutional autonomy.
The first motivating idea is that the harm-preventing behavior some
institutions generate sometimes exceeds the harms the institutions
inevitably generate. That should be uncontroversial.6 The second
motivating idea is more easily questioned. Sometimes an institution’s
autonomy from external supervision is a condition of an institution’s
ability to generate more harm-preventing behavior than harm. The
picture here is this: We want institutions to socialize people well,
meaning that they should induce people to avoid inflicting secular
harms. To accomplish that socialization, institutions must teach their
members or subjects that certain behavior is undesirable or
unacceptable. But, the argument is, sometimes an institution that is
autonomous of external supervision is a more effective teacher than
one that is subject to such supervision—and is more effective because
of that autonomy.
A story may help illustrate why this might be true. Those in
charge of a religiously affiliated institution say, “You must avoid
discriminating on the basis of sex because such actions are
inconsistent with our religious precept that all are equal in God’s
eyes.” A person prone to discriminate on the basis of sex replies,
“Well, you’re just saying that because the government—not God—
has told you to say it. If you don’t say it, you’re going to have to pay
out a lot of money if I act on my inclinations. Your motivation is just
to save money, not to teach me to act in accordance with God’s
word. And because of that, you haven’t really given me a ground for
refraining from acting on my inclinations.” If the institution is
protected by a rule of institutional autonomy, its leaders can reply,
5. The argument I have sketched is a version of the argument that rule-utilitarianism is
a better form of utilitarianism than act-utilitarianism because, when implemented in the real
world, action pursuant to (the right set of) rules produces more utility than action pursuant to
act-by-act judgments of what maximizes utility. For an introduction to the debates, see
generally J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973).
6. It better be, if we are to have institutions at all.
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“No, no, not at all. Because of the rule of institutional autonomy, we
don’t have any liability concerns at all. When we say
nondiscrimination is required by our religion, we are telling you
what God—not the government—has told us.” Obviously the
argument I have just sketched depends crucially on empirical
judgments, most notably those concerning the impact of external
supervision on a religious institution’s ability to inculcate its precepts
and elicit behavior consistent with those precepts.
The scenario just sketched does not—yet—set out a case for a
general rule of institutional autonomy. The argument as presented
may justify institutional autonomy for those religions with religious
definitions of harm consistent with the secular harms the legislature
identifies.7 But not all religions have such precepts; indeed, some
may have religious beliefs that flatly reject the proposition that the
legislatively identified secular harms are harms at all. The argument
sketched so far would not justify a general principle of institutional
autonomy, but only a principle of autonomy for those institutions
whose precepts are compatible with the secular principles the
legislature cares about.
The defense of such a general principle therefore must depend
on an additional quasi-normative proposition: decisionmakers—
judges in particular—are unable reliably to determine whether a
religion’s precepts are inconsistent with the legislature’s normative
judgments. If those administering the law could easily determine that
a religion’s precepts were inconsistent with the legislature’s
normative commitments as expressed in its identification of secular
harms, the first-level argument I have sketched would justify a rule
denying institutional autonomy to religions whose precepts reject
secularly identified harms as harms at all.8
The argument might be extended to justify a general rule of
institutional autonomy by shifting to a higher level. As presented,
the argument moved from the actions of individuals within
institutions affiliated with specific religions (religions with a
particular set of religious precepts) to the actions of those religions
7. Put another way, the argument refers to religions that treat what the legislature
regards as secular harms as religious harms as well.
8. Here the argument is drawn from David Lyons’s classic demonstration that ruleutilitarianism can be reduced to act-utilitarianism by a careful and complete specification of the
set of rules that guide action. See DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM
(1965).
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themselves, including their actions in inculcating religious precepts.
For religions that define harm similarly to legislatures, the net effect
of recognizing institutional autonomy is the reduction of secular
harms. Now, simply move up from the subset of religions with
precepts consistent with the legislature’s to the set of all religions,
including those who perpetuate or do not discourage secular harms.
It could still be the case that recognizing a principle of institutional
autonomy has a net effect of reducing the incidence of secular
harms.9
The preceding argument lays out the case for giving autonomy
to institutions affiliated with religions whose tenets condemn the
secular harms the government seeks to eliminate. As previously
mentioned, not all religions have such tenets,10 and excluding them
maximizes the benefit to society. Conceptually, there is no problem
with limiting the rule of institutional autonomy by giving the
“good” religions autonomy but denying “bad” religions the same
benefit. Institutionalizing such a limitation is another matter.11
Legislatures and courts are unlikely to do a good job of accurately
sorting religions into one class containing the “good” ones—those
whose tenets condemn the secular harms that concern the
government—and another class containing the “bad” ones. Doing so
requires legislatures and courts to examine the religions’ tenets and
match them up with the legislature’s list of secular harms.
There are undoubtedly independent constitutional reasons that
give cause for concern over an approach that requires government
decisionmakers to make some assessment of the content of a
religion’s belief system.12 Those concerns aside, there is certainly a
serious question of institutional capacity. Whatever their other
qualities, the people we select as government decisionmakers are

9. That is, when the negative effects of recognizing institutional autonomy are
subtracted from the positive effects, the total utility remains positive.
10. The usual examples that arise in discussions like this—which are uncontroversial
within the community engaged in the discussion—are Jim Jones, white racist churches, and
(sometimes) the Nation of Islam.
11. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Reflections on the Value of Truth, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
699, 711 n.38 (1991) (“It is important to distinguish here the theoretical possibility of an
empirically justifiable sub-class from the possibility that some theoretically and empirically
distinct sub-class might still not be usable in practice.” (citations omitted)).
12. The “church property” cases, such as Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), imply that
the Constitution bars governments from attempting to determine on their own the content of
a religion’s belief system.
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unlikely to be subtle analysts of the content of a religion’s belief
system.13 This concern is exacerbated when we note that the content
of a religion’s belief system is often contested within the religion
itself: Some adherents will say that the religion condemns
discrimination on the basis of sex, others that it does not, and still
others that it does but that the behavior at issue does not fall within
the religion’s condemnation of such discrimination.
The conclusion then is that there should be a rule generally
providing institutional autonomy to religious institutions. The
“good” religions get it because giving it to them actually reduces the
incidence of secular harms, and the “bad” ones get it because
government decisionmakers cannot reliably distinguish between the
“good” religions and the “bad” ones. And even with the “bad”
religions included, the sum total impact on society is still positive.
Note, though, that the case for institutional autonomy is necessarily
weakened by the extension of autonomy to include “bad” religions,
because the net impact of providing institutional autonomy is
reduced when “bad” religions—those to whom providing
institutional autonomy does not reduce the incidence of secular
harms—are protected by a rule of institutional autonomy.
At this point I can bring Professor Scharffs’s discussion into
mine.14 The argument I have outlined for institutional autonomy
contains nothing distinctive about religions. It is applicable to the
entire range of institutions in civil society, including families,
nongovernmental organizations, and more. The idea of “interindependence” that Professor Scharffs develops15 seems to me
applicable to that entire range as well. That is, a nation’s people and
the government they authorize to act on their behalf benefit from
having a vibrant set of civil-society institutions. The institutions are
independent, but they interact with the government so as to

13. This is particularly so when, as is likely, they will be called upon most often to assess
the content of the belief system of some nonstandard religion—that is, a religion with which
they are unlikely to be familiar outside the decision-making context. And apart from their
general ineptness at conducting such inquiries, government officials might be biased in their
efforts to determine the content of such religions.
14. I will not focus here on the many subissues that Professor Scharffs’s treatment of
inter-independence incorporates.
15. Scharffs, supra note 1, at 1253–58.
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strengthen both the government and the institutions themselves.16
For present purposes, then, the question arises: Should the rules
about institutional autonomy for religious institutions be different
from the rules about institutional autonomy for families or other
nongovernmental organizations?17
As the argument I sketched indicates, one might be concerned
initially about some empirical questions. Without evidence beyond
their own experience and intuitions, many people seem to believe
that autonomous civil-society institutions reduce secular harms
overall.18 We can contrast this belief with the widespread belief,
apparently almost equal in intensity and scope, that the net
contribution of autonomous market institutions is negative—that is,
the belief that the unregulated market has the capacity to cause more
harm than good.19 People appear to believe that government must
have the broad power to restrict the autonomy of market institutions
and ought to exercise that power in a reasonably large number of
cases, after careful consideration of whether regulation will in fact
reduce the incidence of harm.
I confess that it is not obvious to me that civil society’s
institutions, including religious ones, are categorically different from
market institutions in this respect. The argument for institutional
autonomy is that regulation reduces the capacity of institutions to
inculcate prosocial values and to induce prosocial action. That may
well be so, but the empirical question is one of degree: Will
subjecting institutions to regulation reduce their ability to socialize
appropriately by so large an amount as to eliminate the positive
contribution they make? Vicarious liability for sex discrimination
would reduce a religious institution’s ability to socialize its adherents
16. Perhaps the European jurisprudence Professor Scharffs surveys is more comfortable
with the idea of inter-independence because Europeans are more comfortable in dealing with
the general category of civil-society institutions than U.S. legal scholars.
17. One indication that they might not be different is that Professor Gilles’s important
article on the institutional autonomy of families as decisionmakers has the same structure as the
one I have outlined for religious institutions. See Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A
Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937 (1996).
18. Consider, for example, the widespread sense that parents ought to have a right to
decide whether to send their children to public or private schools, or to home school them, a
choice that is indeed protected by the Constitution. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (holding unconstitutional a state law requiring that all children be sent to public
schools).
19. Here the examples are legion: minimum-wage and maximum-hours laws,
environmental regulations, consumer protection laws, and many more.
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appropriately (meaning, again, in accordance with the religion’s own
tenets condemning sex discrimination), but I wonder whether the
reduction would be large.20 Religious institutions, in particular, have
proven to be quite resilient over time, in the sense that subjecting
them to the “regulation” that inevitably comes with living in a partly
secular world has affected, but hardly eliminated, the effectiveness of
their communications concerning God’s requirements to their
adherents.
A second concern is also empirical: Does providing churches with
institutional autonomy yield net positive results for society? Here I
would draw a contrast with the case for granting autonomy to
families. Regulating the internal operations of families might reduce
their ability to socialize children appropriately quite substantially.
Whether the same is true for religious institutions seems to me more
questionable. For most children, the intensity of their involvement
with parents is substantially greater—and therefore likely to have
more powerful socializing effects—than is the intensity of the
involvement of most religious believers with their churches.21
Professor Hamilton suggests one way to think about the rule of
institutional autonomy:22 regulation is not necessarily an all-ornothing affair. Perhaps we can identify particular categories of an
institution’s operations in which regulation would indeed reduce the
institution’s ability to socialize appropriately. So, for example,
perhaps eliminating a narrowly defined ministerial exemption would
greatly decrease a religious institution’s ability to socialize its
adherents appropriately. That does not imply that reducing a broad
ministerial exemption to a narrow one would decrease the ability to
socialize adherents by the same amount, or that denying institutional
autonomy with respect to one aspect of a religious institution’s
operation would affect another.23 A decrease in the ability of a
religion to socialize its adherents appropriately in a given area, due to

20. I note that the transition from a regime of institutional autonomy to one of
regulation might impose substantial one-shot costs (for liabilities built up during the era of no
liability). Such one-shot costs should be disregarded as we examine the case for a prospective
rule of institutional autonomy.
21. The word “most” is important in both its appearances in the sentence in the text.
22. Hamilton, supra note 2, at 1192–96 (discussing the possibility of having different
rules for sex discrimination in connection with different roles within a church).
23. This is how I would rationalize Professor Hamilton’s position on denying
institutional autonomy for actions that harm third parties.
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government regulation of the harm, may be more than offset by a
reduction of harm itself, leaving on the whole a positive balance.
Here the comparison with families is instructive. Many European
nations believe that families should not be categorically exempt from
regulation, because preventing corporal punishment, although
reducing the family’s ability to socialize appropriately, yields—on
balance—a reduction in social harm.24 It could be that particular,
discrete regulations of religious institutions—which are inconsistent
with a broad rule of institutional autonomy—would have similar
effects. The question is of course empirical, and we are unlikely to
get solid evidence one way or the other.
At this point it is appropriate to separate out a third concern. As
mentioned earlier, this concern is institutional. As between courts
implementing a constitutional rule and legislatures defining policy, it
is unclear which is better able to perform the two tasks that the
argument for religious autonomy requires: identify and assess the
relevant empirical information and draw defensible lines based on
that information. Each institution has its abilities and limitations. In
our constitutional system, for example, we tend to think that
legislatures are good at finding and evaluating empirical information
and that courts, by their development of principled doctrines, are
good at drawing defensible lines. Yet legislatures are affected by
limitations on their ability to process information and so may
develop regulations that sweep more broadly than the available
information justifies, and courts can be captured by rigid doctrines
that lead them to apply rules beyond the point where their rationale
extends.25 Our constitutional traditions incline us to give legislatures
the final word when this sort of institutional complication arises, and
I am unpersuaded that the issue of institutional autonomy is one
about which our traditions are likely to mislead us. In short, it seems
to me a good idea to leave it up to legislatures to define the contours
of the rules of institutional autonomy, because they are not likely to
be worse at the job than courts would be.

24. See A. v. United Kingdom, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611 (1999) (Westlaw) (holding that
the beating of a young English boy by his stepfather constituted “inhuman or degrading . . .
punishment” in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights).
25. My personal view is that it would take a great deal of argument to persuade me that
the courts in their constitutional capacity will likely do a better job overall than legislatures will
in devising rules of institutional autonomy for religious institutions. However, I can hardly
claim to have said anything that should lead anyone to share that evaluation.
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There is, finally, a third stage to which the argument for
institutional autonomy can be moved. At that stage the argument is
that simply acknowledging the existence of a rarely or only
occasionally exercised government power to regulate religious
institutions so undermines those institutions’ ability to contribute to
the secular good that government should be denied that power
categorically. As my earlier comments suggest, I suspect that making
that argument convincingly would be quite difficult.26
To conclude, the argument I have outlined is, I think, what goes
into a full defense of the idea of inter-independence as applied
specifically to religious institutions. It seems to me, therefore, that
the real conceptual competitor to the idea of inter-independence is
not independence but rather dependence, in the sense of “subject to
full regulation.”27 It is in this way that Professor Hamilton’s
contribution complements Professor Scharffs’s, by carefully laying
out the case for complete dependence and by allowing us to see
how, even on her own terms, the case for inter-independence is not
an insubstantial one.

26. Again, the European experience with the regulation of families is suggestive.
Europeans appear to believe that the mere existence of government power to regulate
(exercised rarely, as in the case of corporal punishment) does not overly weaken families’ ability
to socialize appropriately. Supra note 24. If that belief is correct, it seems to me quite unlikely
that regulating religious institutions could be worse for society.
27. Or, in Professor Scharffs’s terms, interdependence. Scharffs, supra note 1, at 1251–53.
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